The  Isthmian  Canal 


By 
Lieut*  Col.  George  W,  Goethals,  U.  S.  A. 

Chairman  and  Chief  Engineer,  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission 


Washington 

Government  Printing:  Office 
1909 


THE  ISTHMIAN  CANAL. 


By  Lieut.  Col.  GEO.  W.  GOETHALS,  U.  S.  Army, 
Chairman  and  Chief  Engineer,  Isthmian  Canal 


A  canal  connecting  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans  has  occupied 
public  attention  for  upward  of  four  centuries,  during  which  period 
various  routes  have  been  proposed,  each  having  certain  special  or 
peculiar  advantages.  It  was  not  until  the  nineteenth  century, 
however,  that  any  definite  action  was  taken  looking  toward  its 
accomplishment. 

In  1876  an  organization  was  perfected  in  France  for  making  sur- 
veys and  collecting  data  on  which  to  base  the  construction  of  a 
canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  in  1878  a  concession  for 
prosecuting  the  work  was  secured  from  the  Colombian  Government. 

In  May,  1879,  an  international  congress  was  convened  under  the 
auspices  of  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  to  consider  the  question  of  the 
best  location  and  plan  of  the  canal.  This  congress,  after  a  two 
weeks'  session,  decided  in  favor  of  the  Panama  route  and  of  a  sea- 
level  canal  without  locks.  De  Lesseps' s  success  with  the  Suez  Canal 
made  him  a  strong  advocate  of  the  sea-level  type,  and  his  opinion 
had  considerable  influence  in  the  final  decision. 

Immediately  folio  whig  this  action  the  Panama  Canal  Company  was 
organized  under  the  general  laws  of  France,  with  Ferdinand  de 
Lesseps  as  its  president.  The  concession  granted  in  1878  by  Colom- 
bia was  purchased  by  the  company,  and  the  stock  was  successfully 
floated  in  December,  1880.  The  two  years  following  were  devoted 
largely  to  surveys,  examinations,  and  preliminary  work.  In  the 
first  plan  adopted  the  canal  was  to  be  29.5  feet  deep,  with  a  ruling 
bottom  width  of  72  feet.  Leaving  Colon,  the  canal  passed  through 
low  ground  to  the  valley  of  the  Chagres  River  at  Gatun,  a  distance 
of  about  6  miles;  thence  through  this  valley,  for  21  miles,  to  Obispo, 
where,  leaving  the  river,  it  crossed  the  continental  divide  at  Culebra 
by  means  of  a  tunnel,  and  reached  the  Pacific  through  the  valley 

76494—09 1 

M67198 


2  ISTHMIAN    CANAL. 

of  the  Rio  Grande.  The  difference  in  the  tides  of  the  two  oceans,  9 
inches  in  either  direction  from  the  mean  in  the  Atlantic  and  from  9 
to  11  feet  from  the  same  datum  in  the  Pacific,  was  to  be  overcome 
and  the  final  currents  reduced  by  a  proper  sloping  of  the  bottom  of 
the  Pacific  portion  of  the  canal.  No  provisions  were  made  for  the 
control  of  the  Chagres  River. 

In  the  early  eighties  after  a  study  of  the  flow  due  to  the  tidal 
differences  a  tidal  lock  near  the  Pacific  was  provided.  Various 
schemes  were  also  proposed  for  the  control  of  the  Chagres,  the  most 
prominent  being  the  construction  of  a  dam  at  Gamboa.  The  dam  as 
proposed  afterwards  proved  to  be  impracticable,  and  this  problem 
remained,  for  the  time  being,  unsolved.  The  tunnel  through  the 
divide  was  also  abandoned  in  favor  of  an  open  cut. 

Work  was  prosecuted  on  the  sea-level  canal  until  1887,  when  a 
change  to  the  lock  type  was  made,  in  order  to  secure  the  use  of  the 
canal  for  navigation  as  soon  as  possible.  It  was  agreed  at  that  time 
that  the  change  in  plan  did  not  contemplate  abandonment  of  the 
sea-level  canal,  which  was  ultimately  to  be  secured,  but  merely  its 
postponement  for  the  time  being.  In  this  new  plan  the  summit 
level  was  placed  above  the  flood  line  of  the  Chagres  River,  to  be 
supplied  with  water  from  that  stream  by  pumps.  Work  was  pushed 
forward  until  1889,  wiien  the  company  wrent  into  bankruptcy;  and 
on  February  4  of  that  year  a  liquidator  was  appointed  to  take 
charge  of  its  affairs.  Work  was  suspended  on  May  15,  1889.  The 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  was  organized  in  October,  1894,  when 
work  was  again  resumed,  on  the  plan  recommended  by  a  commission 
of  engineers. 

This  plan  contemplated  a  sea-level  canal  from  Limon  Bay  to  Bohio, 
where  a  dam  across  the  valley  created  a  lake  extending  to  Bas  Obispo, 
the  difference  in  level  being  overcome  by  two  locks;  the  summit  level 
extended  from  Bas  Obispo  to  Paraiso,  reached  by  two  more  locks, 
and  was  supplied  with  water  by  a  feeder  from  an  artificial  reservoir 
created  by  a  dam  at  Alhajuela,  in  the  upper  Chagres  Valley.  Four 
locks  were  located  on  the  Pacific  side,  the  two  middle  ones  at  Pedro 
Miguel  combined  in  a  flight. 

A  second  or  alternative  plan  was  proposed  at  the  same  time,  by 
which  the  summit  level  was  to  be  a  lake  formed  by  the  Bohio  dam, 
fed  directly  by  the  Chagres.  Work  was  continued  on  this  plan  until 


ISTHMIAN    CANAL.  3 

the  rights  and  property  of  the  new  company  were  purchased  by  the 
United  States. 

The  United  States,  not  unmindful  of  the  advantages  of  an  isthmian 
canal,  had  from  time  to  time  made  investigations  and  surveys 
of  the  various  routes.  With  a  view  to  government  ownership  and 
control  Congress  directed  an  investigation  of  the  Nicaraguan  Canal 
for  which  a  concession  had  been  granted  to  a  private  company. 
The  resulting  report  brought  about  such  a  discussion  of  the  advan- 
tages of  the  Panama  route  to  the  Nicaraguan  route,  that  by  an  act 
of  Congress,  approved  March  3,  1889,  a  commission  was  appointed 
to— 

make  full  and  complete  investigation  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  with  a  view  to  the 
construction  of  a  canal  *  *  *  to  connect  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans  *  *  * 
and  particularly  to  investigate  the  two  routes  known  respectively  as  the  Nicaragua 
route  and  the  Panama  route,  with  a  view  to  determining  the  most  practicable  and 
feasible  route  for  such  canal,  together  with  the  approximate  and  probable  cost  of  con- 
structing a  canal  at  each  of  the  two  or  more  of  said  routes. 

The  commission  reported  on  November  16,  1901,  in  favor  of 
Panama,  and  recommended  the  lock  type  of  canal.  The  plan 
consisted  of  a  sea-level  section  from  Colon  to  Bohio,  where  a  dam 
across  the  Chagres  Valley  created  a  summit  level  82  to  90  feet  above 
the  sea,  reached  by  two  locks.  The  lake  or  summit  level  extended 
from  Bohio  to  Pedro  Miguel,  where  two  locks  connected  it  with  a 
pool  28  feet  above  mean  tide,  extending  to  Miraflores,  the  location 
of  the  final  lock.  The  ruling  bottom  width  of  the  canal  prism  was 
fixed  at  150  feet,  increased  at  the  curves  and  in  the  submerged  chan- 
nels. In  Panama  Bay  the  width  was  fixed  at  200  feet,  and  in  the 
artificial  channel  in  Limon  Bay  500  feet  was  adopted,  with  turning 
places  800  feet  wide.  The  minimum  depth  was  35  feet,  and  the 
locks  were  to  have  usable  lengths  of  740  feet  and  widths  of  84  feet. 
The  commission  assessed  the  value  of  the  rights,  franchises,  con- 
cessions, lands,  unfinished  work,  plans,  and  other  property,  including 
the  railroad  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company,  at  $40,000,000. 

By  act  of  Congress,  approved  June  28,  1902,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  was  authorized  to  acquire,  at  a  cost  not  exceeding 
$40,000,000,  the  property  rights  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company 
on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  also  to  secure  from  the  Republic  of 
Colombia  perpetual  control  of  a  strip  of  land  not  less  than  6  miles 


4  ISTHMIAN   CANALr. 

wide,  extending  from  the  Caribbean  Sea  to  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
and— 

the  right  *  *  *  to  excavate,  construct,  and  to  perpetually  maintain,  operate, 
and  protect  thereon  a  canal  of  such  depth  and  capacity  as  will  afford  convenient 
passage  of  ships  of  the  greatest  tonnage  and  draft  now  in  use. 

In  event  the  provisions  for  the  purchase,  and  for  securing  the  nec- 
essary concession  from  Colombia  could  not  be  carried  out,  the  Presi- 
dent was  authorized  to  secure  the  rights  necessary  for  the  construc- 
tion of  the  Nicaraguan  Canal. 

;  The  law  also  provided,  after  the  foregoing  arrangements  had  been 
perfected,  that — 

the  President  shall  then,  through  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  *  *  *  cause 
to  be  excavated,  constructed,  and  completed  a  canal  from  the  Caribbean  Sea  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean.  Such  canal  shall  be  of  sufficient  capacity  and  depth  as  shall  afford 
convenient  passage  for  vessels  of  the  largest  tonnage  and  greatest  draft  now  in  use, 
and  such  as  may  be  reasonably  anticipated. 

To  enable  the  President  to  carry  out  these  provisions  certain  sums 
were  appropriated  and  a  bond  issue,  not  to  exceed  one  hundred  and 
thirty  millions  of  dollars,  was  authorized.  By  this  act  Congress,  in 
accepting  the  estimates  accompanying  the  report  of  the  commission 
of  1901,  adopted  the  type  proposed  by  the  board,  or  a  lock  canal. 

Pursuant  to  the  legislation,  negotiations  were  entered  into  with 
Colombia  and  with  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company,  with  the  end 
that  a  treaty  was  made  with  the  Kepublic  of  Panama  granting  to 
the  United  States  control  of  a  10-mile  strip,  constituting  the  Canal 
Zone,  with  the  right  to  construct,  maintain,  and  operate  a  canal. 
This  treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Republic  of  Panama  on  December  2, 
1903,  and  by  the  United  States  on  February  23,  1904. 

The  formal  transfer  of  the  property  of  the  New  Panama  Canal 
Company  on  the  Isthmus  was  made  on  May  4,  1904,  after  which  the 
United  States  began  the  organization  of  a  force  for  the  construction 
of  the  lock  type  of  canal,  in  the  meantime  continuing  the  excavation 
by  utilizing  the  French  material  and  equipment  and  such  labor  as 
was  procurable  on  the  Isthmus. 

The  question  of  a  sea-level  canal  was  again  agitated,  and  secured 
such  recognition  that  the  President  convened  an  international  board 
of  engineers,  consisting  of  13  members,  to  assemble  at  Washington 
on  the  1st  day  of  September,  1905,  for  the  purpose  of  considering  the 
various  plans  for  the  construction  of  the  canal  that  would  be  sub- 
mitted to  it. 


ISTHMIAN    CANAL.  5 

The  plans  submitted  may  be  briefly  summarized  as — 

(1)  That   of  the   commission   of   1901,   which  has   already   been 
explained. 

(2)  A  lock  canal  with  terminal  lakes  proposed  by  Mr.  Lindon  W. 
Bates,  and  for  which  three  projects  were  proposed.     The  one  which  he 
appeared  to  favor  contemplated  a  summit  level  of  62  feet  above  the 
sea,  created  by  a  dam  at  Bohio,  and  an  intermediate  level  of  33 i 
feet  above  mean  tide,  effected  by  a  dam  at  Mindi.     This  plan  pro- 
vided four  locks — at  Mindi,   Bohio,   Pedro   Miguel,   and    Sosa.     A 
variant  of  the  plan  contemplated  a  dam  at  Gatun  instead  of  at 
Bohio,  showing  that,  at  least  for  a  30-foot  head,  the  Gatun  loca- 
tion was  not  considered    by  him  as  unfavorable  or  offering    any 
difficulties     respecting     the    foundations.     His    other    plans    were 
modifications  of  this,  the  summit  levels  being  27  or  62  feet,  but  in 
each  instance  the  lock  type  was  advocated. 

(3)  The   plan   proposed    by  Mr.    Bunau-Varilla,  carried  out  the 
ideas  of  the  first  French  company,  namely,  the  construction  of  a  lock 
canal  with  a  summit  level  130  feet  above  mean  tide,  to  be  ultimately 
converted  into  a  sea-level  canal,  or  what  he  calls  the  Straits  of  Panama. 
The  locks  were  to  be  constructed  so  that  as  the  levels  were  deepened 
by  dredging  they  could  be  eliminated,  navigation  continuing  during 
the  enlargement  and  transformation.     The  material  removed  by  the 
dredges  was  to  be  deposited  in  the  lake  formed  of  the  upper  Chagres 
River  by  a  dam  at  Gamboa,  and  any  suitable  locations  in  the  various 
pools  between  the  locks.     In  commenting  on  this  plan  the  Board  of 
Consulting  Engineers  concluded  that — 

After  a  full  and  careful  consideration  of  all  the  features  of  Mr.  Bunau-Varilla' s  plan, 
the  board  is  of  the  opinion  that  it  should  not  be  adopted  for  the  Panama  Canal  for  the 
following  reasons: 

1.  The  construction  of  the  large  locks  required  under  the  present  law  and  necessary 
for  the  accommodation  of  the  traffic  seeking  the  canal  after  its  completion  makes  it  quite 
impossible  to  complete  the  preliminary  lock  canal  even  nearly  within  the  period 
stated. 

2.  The  excessive  cost  of  transformation  added  to  the  loss  of  costly  locks  and  other 
appurtenant  structures  required  by  the  preliminary  lock  canal. 

3.  If  the  lock  canal  is  likely  to  be  retained  for  many  years,  it  should  be  made  for  the 
most  efficient  service,  and- not  be  encumbered  with  modifications  in  lock  construction 
which  would  prove  inconvenient  in  use. 

(4)  A  plan  proposed  by  Maj.  Cassius  E.  Gillette,  a  lock  canal  with 
a  summit  level  100  feet  above  mean  tide  by  the  construction  of  a 
dam  across  the  Chagres  Valley  at  Gatun. 


6  ISTHMIAN   CANAL. 

No  sea-level  plan  was  submitted  for  consideration,  so  that  the 
board  outlined  a  general  plan  of  its  own,  and  for  purposes  of  com- 
parison adopted  as  the  lock  type  a  60-foot  summit  level  canal.  Two 
levels  were  used,  the  summit  level  was  carried  by  an  earth  dam  at 
Bohio,  and  the  intermediate  level  by  an  earth  dam  at  Gatun,  each 
dam  sustaining  a  head  of  30  feet.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  no  difficul- 
ties were  anticipated  in  the  construction  of  these  dams,  and  there 
was  no  dread  or  fear  of  the  foundations. 

As  the  result  of  its  deliberations,  the  board  submitted  a  majority 
report  and  a  minority  report  signed  by  five  of  its  members,  the 
former  advocating  a  sea-level  canal  and  the  latter  a  lock  canal,  with 
the  summit  level  85  feet  above  mean  tide. 

The  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  with  one  dissenting  voice,  recom- 
mended to  the  President  the  adoption  of  the  lock  type  recommended 
by  the  minority,  which  was  also  strongly  advocated  by  the  then  chief 
engineer,  Mr.  John  F.  Stevens.  The  President,  in  the  message  to 
Congress,  dated  February  19,  1906,  stated: 

The  law  now  on  our  statute  books  seems  to  contemplate  a  lock  canal.  In  my 
judgment  a  lock  canal,  as  herein  recommended,  is  advisable.  If  the  Congress  directs 
that  a  sea-level  canal  be  constructed  its  direction  will,  of  course,  be  carried  out; 
otherwise  the  canal  will  be  built  on  substantially  the  plan  for  a  lock  canal  outlined 
in  the  accompanying  papers,  such  changes  being  made,  of  course,  as  may  be  found 
actually  necessary,  including  possibly  the  change  recommended  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  as  to  the  site  of  the  dam  on  the  Pacific  side. 

On  June  29,  1906,  Congress  provided  that  a  lock  type  of  canal  be 
constructed  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  of  the  general  type  pro- 
posed by  the  minority  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers,  and 
work  has  continued  along  these  lines.  As  originally  proposed,  the 
plan  consisted  of  a  practically  straight  channel  500  feet  wide,  41 
feet  deep  from  deep  water  in  the  Caribbean  to  Gatun,  where  an 
ascent  to  the  85-foot  level  was  made  by  three  locks  in  flight.  The 
level  is  maintained  by  a  dam  approximately  7,700  feet  long,  one-half 
mile  wide  at  the  base,  100  feet  wide  at  the  top,  constructed  to  135 
feet  above  mean  tide.  The  lake  formed  by  this  dam,  171  square 
miles  in  extent,  carried  navigation  to  Pedro  Miguel,  where  a  lock  of 
30  feet  lift  carried  the  vessel  down  to  a  lake  55  feet  above  mean 
tide,  extending  to  Sosa  Hill,  where  two  locks  overcame  the  difference 
of  level  between  the  lake  surface  and  the  Pacific.  Nineteen  and 
eight-hundredths  miles  of  the  distance  from  Gatun  to  Sosa  Hill  had  a 


ISTHMIAN    CANAL.  7 

channel  1,000  feet  at  the  bottom,  a  minimum  channel  for  4£  miles 
through  Culebra  of  200  feet  at  the  bottom.  The  balance  of  the  dis- 
tance varied  in  width  to  800  feet,  the  larger  portion  of  the  entire 
canal  being  not  less  than  500  feet.  The  depth  of  water  was  fixed  at 
45  feet.  The  lake  assured  a  perfect  control  of  the  Chagres  River. 

Certain  changes  have  been  made  in  the  original  project,  the  most 
important  being  the  withdrawal  of  the  locks  from  Sosa  to  Mira- 
flores,  which  was  recommended  and  adopted  in  December,  1907. 
This  resulted  in  a  change  in  the  direction  of  the  channel  in  Panama 
Bay.  A  breakwater  is  being  constructed  from  Sosa  to  Naos  Island 
which,  by  cutting  off  the  silt-bearing  cross  current,  which  has  always 
been  troublesome,  protects  the  channel  against  silting. 

A  second  change  is  the  widening  of  the  4J  miles  of  Culebra  cut  to 
a  width  of  300  feet  at  the  bottom.  This  was  done  by  executive 
order  and  was  not  made  on  the  recommendation  of  the  commission. 

A  third  change  is  the  location  of  the  breakwaters  in  Colon  Harbor. 
The  necessity  for  these  breakwaters  was  made  apparent  in  the  latter 
part  of  January,  when  a  storm  of  some  magnitude  seriously  inter- 
fered with  shipping.  As  originally  proposed  for  both  the  sea  level 
and  lock  types,  the  breakwaters  were  parallel  to  the  axis  of  the  chan- 
nel excavated  in  Limon  Bay.  If  so  constructed,  sufficient  area 
would  not  be  given  to  dissipate  the  waves  entering  head  on  into  the 
channel,  and  they  would  not  afford  much,  if  any,  protection  to 
shipping.  These  breakwaters  are  to  be  built  out  from  Manzanillo 
Island  and  Toro  Point,  so  as  to  give  a  sheltered  anchorage,  and  also 
an  opportunity  for  such  expansion  to  the  waves  as  to  break  them  up. 

A  fourth  change  is  in  the  dimensions  of  the  locks.  As  proposed  by 
the  minority  they  were  900  feet  by  95  feet,  usable  lengths  and\widths. 
These  dimensions  were  subsequently  changed  by  the  commission  at 
the  instigation  of  the  President  to  dimensions  100  feet  wide  and  1,000 
feet  long.  The  width  was  again  increased  to  110  feet  on  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  General  Board  of  the  Navy,  so  as  to  accommodate 
any  possible  increase  in  beam  of  future  battleships. 

The  Gatun  dam  is  to  consist  of  two  piles  of  rock  1,200  feet  apart  and 
carried  up  to  60  feet  above  mean  tide.  The  space  between  them  and 
up  to  the  required  height  is  to  be  filled  by  selected  material  deposited 
in  place  by  the  hydraulic  process.  During  the  construction  of  the 
north  side  of  the  south  rock  pile  a  slip  occurred  in  November  last  at  the 


ISTHMIAN   CANAL. 

crossing  of  the  French  Canal.  This  was  the  fifth  slip  that  occurred 
at  this  point,  the  rock  settling  to  sofne  extent,  but  generally  slipping 
sidewise  until  the  angle  of  repose  was  reached.  In  this  connec- 
tion it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  silt  deposits  in  the  channel  had  not 
been  removed.  This  slip  would  probably  have  passed  unnoticed, 
as  did  the  former  ones,  but  for  the  fact  that  at  the  time  a  flood  in 
the  Chagres  River  had  attained  such  proportions  as  to  cover  a  por- 
tion of  the  Panama  Railroad  tracks  just  south  of  Gatun.  A  news- 
paper correspondent,  going  from  Colon  to  Panama,  saw  his  oppor- 
tunity for  a  sensational  story,  and  attributed  the  flood  to  the  drop- 
ping of  the  Gatun  dam  into  the  subterranean  lake  under  the  dam 
and  locks,  which  another  faker  had  previously  discovered,  and  the 
news  of  the  destruction  of  the  Gatun  dam  was  cabled  to  the  States. 

The  slip  did  not  affect  the  south  slope  or  side  of  the  rock  pile.  It 
was  entirely  local  and  did  not  in  any  way  interfere  with  the  work. 
It  would  not  have  occurred  had  steps  been  taken  during  construc- 
tion to  give  the  proper  slope  to  the  rock  pile,  but  economy  of  time  and 
money  did  not  warrant  such  precaution.  As  stated  by  one  of  the 
engineering  publications,  "We  can  state  from  actual  personal  exami- 
nation that  this  incident  has  absolutely  no  engineering  significance." 

As  a  result,  however,  the  public  is  told  that  dire  disaster  will  follow 
the  undertaking  unless  the  present  plans  are  abandoned  and  the 
Straits  of  Panama  constructed,  that  is  a  se'a-level  canal  across  the 
Isthmus  500  to  600  feet  wide.  To  accomplish  this,  however,  a  lock 
canal  must  be  built  first,  and  subsequently  widened  and  deepened 
until  the  ideal  is  reached.  There  is  no  data  available  for  such  a  canal. 
With  mountains  instead  of  hills  to  be  removed  estimates  are,  of 
course,  impossible;  so  the  most  optimistic  figures,  suitable  alone  to 
the  ideal,  are  offered  as  a  bait.  In  any  event  it  is  also  claimed  that 
Bohio  should  have  been  selected  for  the  site  of  the  dam  in  lieu  of  Gatun. 

As  between  Gatun  and  Bohio,  at  both  places  the  distance  from  the 
natural  surface  to  the  rock  is  so  great  that  any  attempt  to  found  the 
dam  on  the  last-named  material  will  be  attended  by  enormous  ex- 
pense. At  Bohio  the  gorge  in  its  lower  strata  is  filled  with  water- 
bearing gravel  and  to  make  the  dam  safe  the  underflow  through 
these  strata  would  have  to  be  cut  off  by  some  means  extending  down 
165  feet.  No  such  strata  exist  at  Gatun,  so,  for  this  reason  alone, 
leaving  out  of  consideration  the  advantages  in  the  control  of  the 


ISTHMIAN    CANAL.  9 

Chagres  River  and  to  navigation  by  reason  of  the  greater  extent 
of  lake,  Gatun  offers  the  better  site. 

Both  the  majority  and  minority  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engi- 
neers considered  Gatun  a  suitable  location  for  a  dam;  the  former 
adopted  it  for  the  typical  lock  canal  used  for  comparison  with  the 
sea-level  canal,  the  latter  for  the  85-foot  summit-level  canal.  The 
majority,  however,  feared  the  existence  of  an  underground  flow  in 
case  of  the  higher  dam,  but  investigations  have  failed  to  disclose 
any.  The  great  mass  of  underlying  material  is  not  sandy  and 
gravelly  deposits  as  was  supposed,  but  a  mixture  of  these  materials 
so  firmly  cemented  together  with  clay  as  to  make  the  strata  in  which 
they  occur  impervious  to  water. 

I  venture  the  statement,  without  fear  of  contradiction,  that  the 
site  of  no  public  or  private  work  of  any  kind  has  received  such  a 
thorough  and  exhaustive  examination  and  investigation  as  the 
foundation  of  the  dam  and  locks  at  Gatun.  There  is  no  longer  a 
doubt  concerning  any  of  the  underlying  strata;  neither  the  imper- 
meability, nor  the  ability  of  the  foundations  to  bear  the  loads  that 
will  be  brought  upon  them,  can  be  questioned  if  the  data  be  carefully 
and  impartially  examined.  The  investigations  fail  to  disclose  any 
water-bearing  strata  or  the  existence  of  that  underground  stream 
with  a  discharge  equal  to  the  Chagres  River  itself,  which  was  recently 
asserted  as  a  fact  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate. 

In  this  connection  the  statement  is  also  made  that  the  change  in 
the  location  of  the  locks  at  the  Pacific  end  was  due  to  our  demon- 
strated inability  to  construct  the  dams,  and  that  as  the  foundation  at 
Gatun  is  of  the  same  material,  it  necessarily  followed  that  the  Gatun 
dam  is  also  impossible  of  accomplishment. 

The  majority  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  in  its  report 
states  that — 

The  dam  at  La  Boca,  between  San  Juan  Point  and  the  Sosa  Hill,  unless  carried  down 
to  bed  rock  at  that  location,  would  be  placed  upon  a  far  worse  foundation  than  that 
proposed  at  Gatun  or  Mindi.  The  La  Boca  site  is  one  covered  by  an  ooze  of  mud  or 
silt,  with  some  sandy  material  overlying  the  rock.  *  *  *  Unless  some  feature 
equivalent  to  that  of  a  heavy  masonry  core  characterized  the  design  of  the  dam  at  this 
point,  or  unless  a  resort  be  made  to  dredging  down  to  bed  rock  or  near  to  it,  and  refilling 
with  suitable  material,  or  an  earth  dam  at  this  location  be  made  very  massive,  it  would 
be  in  grave  danger  of  being  pushed  bodily  out  of  place  by  the  pressure  due  to  the 
head  of  water  in  the  reservoir. 
76494—09 2 


10  ISTHMIAN    CANAL. 

We  found  the  material  in  the  foundations  of  these  dams  not  only 
worse  than  at  Gatun,  but  in  nowise  comparable.  In  the  former  a 
covering  of  ooze  and  silt,  in  the  latter  firm  ground  with  a  few  soft 
or  marshy  spots. 

I  know  that  the  La  Boca  dams  could  be  built  to  safely  withstand 
the  heads  of  water  in  the  resulting  lake  by  adopting  either  the 
method  of  dredging  out  the  ooze  or  by  giving  massive  dimensions 
to  the  superimposed  structure.  The  engineering  committee  and 
the  majority  of  the  commission  preferred  the  former  method.  In 
either  case  the  cost  would  exceed  the  original  estimates,  and  in  addi- 
tion it  is  a  military  blunder  to  push  the  locks  to  and  beyond  the 
proper  line  of  defense,  especially  when  the  canal  is  a  military  neces- 
sity to  this  country.  That  the  dams  could  be  built  is  evidenced  by 
the  fact  that  the  west  toe  of  the  Sosa-Corozal  dam  was  carried  across 
the  valley  on  the  ooze  as  an  embankment  for  a  railroad  to  be  utilized 
in  transporting  stone  for  the  Pacific  locks.  The  charge,  therefore, 
that  the  dams  could  not  be  constructed  is  not  true,  and  the  analogy 
at  Gatun  does  not  follow.  Nor  is  there  any  truth  in  the  state- 
ment that  the  military  necessity  was  an  afterthought  as  has  been 
insinuated. 

I  visited  the  Isthmus  in  1905  with  a  committee  of  the  Board  of 
National  Coast  Defenses,  with  which  I  was  associated  at  that  time, 
for  a  study  of  the  defenses  of  the  canal.  When  the  location  of  the 
locks  at  the  Pacific  end  was  fixed,  I  was  directed  to  call  the  Secretary 
of  War's  attention  to  the  military  necessity  of  withdrawing  the 
locks  to  the  interior.  This  I  did,  with  the  result  that  in  forwarding 
the  report  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  to  the  President 
he  calls  attention  to  the  fact  as  follows: 

The  great  objection  to  the  locks  at  Sosa  Hill  is  the  possibility  of  their  destruction 
by  the  fire  from  an  enemy's  ship.  If,  as  has  been  suggested  to  me  by  officers  of  this 
department  entitled  to  speak  with  authority  on  military  subjects,  these  locks  may 
be  located  against  and  behind  Sosa  Hill  in  such  a  way  as  to  use  the  hill  as  a  protection 
against  such  fire,  then  economy  would  lead  to  the  retention  of  this  lake.  If, 

however,  Sosa  Hill  will  not  afford  a  site  with  such  protection,  then  it  seerns  to  me 
wiser  to  place  the  locks  at  Miraflores. 

In  forwarding  the  report  to  Congress,  the  President  calls  atten- 
tion to  the  change  recommended  by  the  Secretary  of  War  in  the 
location  of  the  locks  on  the  Pacific  side.  The  so-called  afterthought 
appears,  therefore,  as  a  conclusion  reached  long  before  I  had  any 
connection  with  the  work. 


U?  TY 

ISTHMIAN   CANAL.  11 

Discredit  is  also  thrown  on  the  Gatum  dam  because  there  has  been 
a  desire*  to  reduce  the  height  from  135  to  105  feet.  The  original 
height  was  arbitrarily  fixed  to  secure  an  excess  of  weight,  so  as  to 
fully  compress  the  underlying  material  supposed  to  be  largely  silt 
deposited  by  the  river.  Subsequent  investigations  show  that  the1 
supposed  compressibility  does  not  exist;  that  a  marine,  not  a  river 
deposit  is  encountered.  The  greater  the  height  of  the  dam  the 
greater  the  difficulty  of  constructing  the  upper  portion,  and  the 
greater  the  cost,  both  in  time  and  money.  From  present  available 
data,  if  the  lake  should  take  the  total  discharge  of  the  Chagres  River, 
the  water  surface  would  not  exceed  90  feet;  the  top  of  the  locks,  92 
feet  above  sea  level,  would  permit  escape  of  the  water  long  before 
it  could  reach  the  crest  of  the  dam.  Why  then  go  to  the  expense  of 
the  extra  height  of  the  dam,  and  what  is  to  be  gained  thereby? 
Assuming  the  crest  of  the  dam  as  100  feet  wide,  uniform  slopes  from 
the  rock  piles  would  give  a  height  of  105  feet,  and  this  height  was 
suggested.  Because  as  an  additional  reason  it  was  mentioned  that' 
the  pressure  over  the  base  would  be  more  uniformly  distributed  by 
a  dam  with  the  cross  section  proposed,  the  opponents  of  the  present 
project,  without  ascertaining  the  facts,  point  to  the  change  as  a 
desire  to  secure  a  uniform  base  pressure,  and  use  it  as  an  argu- 
ment against  the  stability  of  the  foundation. 

Much  also  has  been  made  of  the  fact  that  in  the  testimony  before 
one  of  the  congressional  committees  mention  was  made  of  securing 
the  stability  of  the  superstructure  by  balancing  the  dam  on  the 
underlying  material.  Naturally  the  testimony  is  read  and  dis- 
cussed in  such  a  way  as  to  leave  the  impression  that  the  entire  dam 
is  to  be  so  constructed.  The  ground  to  be  covered  by  the  dam  is 
crossed  by  three  water  courses,  the  Chagres  River,  the  French  Canal, 
and  the  West  Diversion,  and  between  these  streams  the  ground  is 
undulating,  Spillway  Hill  reaching  a  height  of  110  feet  above  sea 
level.  It  is  not  remarkable  or  unprecedented  that  there  should  be 
depressions  which  undrained  become  soft  with  the  excessive  rainfall. 
Except  for  these  the  ground  is  firm.  It  is  in  the  crossing  of  these 
soft  spots  that  slips  have  occurred  and  are  liable  to  occur,  and  to 
which  the  balancing  method  referred.  They  are  relatively  small 
in  extent  and  when  drained  or  filled  cause  no  trouble,  as  experience 
at  the  La  Boca  embankment  clearly  proves. 


12  ISTHMIAN    CANAL. 

As  previously  stated,  the  Gatun  dam  satisfactorily  solves  the 
problem  of  the  control  of  the  Chagres,  and  there  should  be  no  doubt 
in  the  mind  of  anyone  who  impartially  examines  the  data  that  the 
solution  is  not  only  feasible,  but  absolutely  safe.  As  there  has  never 
been  any  question  raised  as  to  the  safety  and  stability  of  the  dams 
at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores,  with  the  Gatun  dam  accepted,  other 
things  being  equal,  the  relative  merits  of  the  lock  versus  sea-level 
canal  must  rest  upon  the  ease  and  safety  of  navigation  offered  by 
the  two  types. 

In  the  sea-level  type  offered  in  lieu  of  the  lock  type  already  de- 
scribed, the  Chagres  River  is  controlled  by  a  masonry  dam  across 
the  valley  at  Gamboa  4,500  feet  long,  750  feet  of  which  is  subject  to 
a  pressure  due  to  a  head  of  170  feet  during  the  extreme  flood  stages 
of  the  river.  Proper  sluice  gates  are  proposed  for  discharging  the 
river  into  the  canal.  The  difference  in  tides  is  overcome  by  means 
of  a  lock  on  the  Pacific  side  in  the  vicinity  of  Sosa  Hill.  While  pro- 
visions are  made  for  damming  or  diverting  some  of  the  streams  that 
would  otherwise  enter  the  canal  prism,  not  less  than  22  flow  directly 
into  the  canal,  with  no  provision  to  control  the  currents  or  check 
the  deposits  of  material  carried  by  them  during  flood  stages. 

The  prism  of  the  canal  is  to  have  a  bottom  width  of  150  feet  through 
the  earth  sections,  or  for  nearly  one-half  its  length,  and  a  200-foot 
bottom  width  through  the  rock  sections.  Nineteen  miles  of  the 
length  are  made  of  curves  so  that  the  proposed  sea-level  canal  is  not 
a  wide,  straight,  and  open  channel,  connecting  the  two  oceans,  but 
a  narrow  tortuous  ditch,  with  varying  currents  of  unknown  strength, 
impeded  by  a  lock,  and  threatened  by  a  dam  resisting  a  pressure  due 
to  a  head  twice  as  great  as  that  at  Gatun. 

To  be  sure,  the  partisans  of  the  sea-level  type  are  now  proposing  to 
eliminate  both  the  Gamboa  Dam  and  the  tidal  lock  by  making  the 
channel  so  wide  as  to  reduce  the  currents  that  result  from  the  dis- 
charge of  the  Chagres  and  the  difference  in  tides,  but  fail  to  explain 
how  they  purpose  to  control  or  divert  the  Chagres,  the  bed  of  which 
will  be  50  feet  above  the  water  surface  of  the  canal  at  the  juncture. 
As  data  is  not  available  for  preparing  accurate  estimates  for  even 
such  a  sea-level  type  as  was  originally  offered,  neither  they  nor  any 
one  else  can  offer  any  figures  as  to  time  and  cost  for  the  construction 
of  such  a  canal  as  they  now  advocate. 


ISTHMIAN    CANAL.  13 

In  any  comparison,  therefore,  we  must  confine  our  attention  to  the 
lock  type  as  now  building,  and  a  sea-level  canal  as  offered  by  the 
board  of  engineers,  and  not  by  the  idealist. 

So  far  as  the  two  prisms  are  concerned,  for  ease  and  safety  of  nav- 
igation the  lock  type  is  better  because  of  the  greater  widths  of  chan- 
nels, fewer  and  easier  curves,  and  freedom  from  objectionable  and 
troublesome  currents,  both  from  the  Chagres  and  its  tributaries. 
This  must  be  admitted  by  all,  but  the  exponents  of  the  sea-level  type 
concentrate  their  attention  on  the  obstructions  and  dangers  that  the 
locks  constitute  in  the  lock  type,  and  also  on  the  dangers  that  will 
result  from  the  failure  of  the  Gatun  dam,  forgetting  that  at  least 
equally  great  disaster  must  follow  the  failure  of  the  Gamboa  dam. 
The  lock  in  the  sea-level  canal  is  not  mentioned,  probably  because  the 
danger  is  not  so  great,  since  there  is  but  one. 

Experience  shows  that  the  risks  to  ships  in  narrow  waterways  are 
material  and  important.  In  such  a  channel  as  the  original  Suez 
Canal  the  delays  and  losses  to  commerce  were  great,  and  the  danger 
to  ships  considerable;  although  the  benefit  of  the  widening  is  strik- 
ing, this  is  true  even  now. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  narrow  channels  connecting  the  Great 
Lakes  have  been  obstructed  repeatedly  by  vessels  aground  or  wrecked 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  block  traffic.  Even  in  the  entrances  to  our 
seaports  there  is  a  frequency  of  accidents,  which  illustrate  the  dif- 
.ficulties  encountered  in  navigating  narrow  and  tortuous  channels. 

Accidents  in  locks  have  been  relatively  few,  and  none  of  a  serious 
nature  have  occurred  at  the  St.  Marys  Falls  Canal  during  fifty-four 
years  of  its  use.  The  risks  to  ships  in  such  a  narrow  waterway,  as 
proposed  for  the  sea-level  canal  at  Panama,  far  outweigh  all  haz- 
ards in  the  proposed  lock  canal,  PROVIDED  the  latter  is  built  so  as  to 
minimize  the  chance  of  accident  at  the  locks.  This  is  met  by  pro- 
viding every  possible  safety  device,  by  building  the  locks  in  duplicate 
and  by  the  installation  of  a  system  by  which  the  vessels  will  be  con- 
trolled by  powerful  electric  machinery  on  the  lock  walls,  thus  avoid- 
ing mistakes  on  the  part  of  the  vessels'  crew  or  engine-room  staff, 
which  once  led  to  an  accident  at  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal. 

Again,  it  is  objected  that  the  size  of  the  locks  limits  the  canal  to 
vessels  which  can  use  them.  This  is  true.  The  present  lock  designs 
provide  intermediate  gates  dividing  the  locks  into  lengths  of  600  and 


14  ISTHMIAN    CANAL. 

400  feet.  About  98  per  cent  of  all  the  ships,  including  the  largest 
battle  ships  now  building,  can  be  passed  through  the  600-foot  lengths, 
and  the  total  lock  length  will  accommodate  the  largest  commercial 
vessels  now  building,  which,  I  believe,  are  1,000  feet  long  and  88-foot 
beam. 

It  is  true  that  ships  may  increase  in  size  so  as  to  make  the  present 
locks  obsolete,  but  the  largest  ships  now  afloat  can  not  navigate  the 
present  Suez  Canal,  nor  the  proposed  sea-level  canal  at  Panama.  It 
must  also  be  remembered  that  the  commerce  of  the  world  is  carried 
by  the  medium-sized  vessels,  the  length  of  only  one  of  the  many 
ships  using  the  Suez  Canal  being  greater  than  600  feet. 
•  The  General  Board  of  the  Navy  is  on  record  that  110  foot  width 
will  be  ample  for  the  future  needs  of  the  Navy,  and  naval  construc- 
tion of  the  future  will  be  limited  not  alone  by  the  locks  of  the  Pan- 
ama Canal,  but  also  by  the  available  dry  clocks.  Ships  that  can  not 
use  locks  1,000  feet  by  110  feet  can  not  use  a  150-foot  sea-level  canal, 
nor  can  this  be  so  easily  and  economically  increased  and  maintained 
as  is  made  to  appear  by  its  advocates. 

Increasing  the  width  of  Culebra  cut,  as  recently  ordered,  from  200 
to  300  feet  is  advanced  as  an  argument  to  show  that  the  locks  are 
too  narrow.  Ships  do  not  navigate  the  locks  in  the  sense  that  they 
do  the  canal  prism,  and  the  wider  the  channel  the  easier  will  be 
navigation.  On  account  of  slides  that  developed  in  Culebra  cut 
considerably  more  additional  work  was  made  necessary  in  the  upper 
reaches  of  the  divide  than  was  contemplated,  and  the  advantages 
of  the  increased  width  to  navigation  were  so  great,  compared  with 
the  relative  amount  of  material  to  be  removed  in  order  to  secure  it, 
that  the  President  ordered  it.  By  this  action  the  width  of  the  locks 
is  in  nowise  called  into  question. 

The  water  supply  for  lockages  was  so  exhaustively  treated  by  the 
minority  of  the  board  that  it  has  not  been  called  into  question  by 
anyone  who  has  carefully  considered  the  report  and  data  submitted 
therewith.  Recently,  however,  the  theory  has  been  advanced  that 
the  water  of  the  lake  may  seep  through  the  adjacent  hills  or  through 
the  bottom,  and  is  significantly  referred  to  as  a  mooted  question. 
This  possibility  is  emphasized  by  the  seamy  quality  of  the  rock 
when  exposed.  The  French  plans,  with  Bohio  Lake,  were  the  result 
of  careful  and  protracted  study  and  investigation,  and  nothing  of 


ISTHMIAN    CANAL.  15 

the  kind  was  anticipated.  The  commission  of  1901  was  not  in  doubt 
of  the  resisting  power  of  the  hill  covering  such  a  flow.  The  report 
of  the  geologist  on  the  general  formation  of  the  country  does  not 
lead  to  any  such  dread  or  fear.  The  reservoirs,  constructed  in  the 
hills  of  the  same  geological  formation  as  the  entire  lake  area,  are 
not  affected  by  any  such  leakage  or  seepage.  At  Black  Swamp, 
an  extensive  area  between  Bohio  and  Gatun,  the  water  stands  above 
the  level  of  the  Chagres — w^hich  is  within  half  a  mile — and  also 
above  sea  level  the  level  of  the  water  remains  unchanged,  clearly 
indicating  no  such  leakage. 

Toward  the  close  of  the  last  dry  season  certain  measurements  of 
the  Chagres  at  Bohio  indicated  a  less  discharge  there  than  at  Gamboa; 
this  was  subsequently  exploded  by  other  observations  which  showed 
that  the  first  ones  were  in  error.  Notwithstanding  this,  and  in  spite 
of  the  many  evidences  of  the  tightness  of  the  earth  covering,  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  flow  through  the  hills  was  advanced  and  was  seized 
upon  as  another  argument  against  the  lock  type. 

The  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  estimated  the  cost  of  the 
lock  type  of  canal  at  $139,705,200,  and  of  the  sea-level  canal  at 
$247,021,000,  excluding  the  cost  of  sanitation,  civil  government,  the 
purchase  price,  and  interest  on  the  investment.  These  sums  were 
for  construction  purposes  only. 

I  ventured  a  guess  that  the  construction  of  the  lock  type  of  canal 
would  approach  $300,000,000,  and  without  stopping  to  consider 
that  the  same  causes  which  led  to  an  increase  in  cost  over  the  original 
estimates  for  the  lock  canal  must  affect  equally  the  sea-level  type, 
the  advocates  of  the  latter  argued  that  the  excess  of  the  new  estimates 
was  an  additional  reason  why  the  lock  type  should  be  abandoned  in 
favor  of  the  sea-level  canal. 

The  estimated  cost  by  the  present  commission  for  completing  the 
adopted  project,  excluding  the  items  let  out  by  the  Board  of  Consult- 
ing Engineers,  is  placed  at  $297,766,000.  If  to  this  be  added  the 
estimated  cost  of  sanitation  and  civil  government  until  the  com- 
pletion of  the  work,  and  the  $50,000,000  purchase  price,  the  total 
cost  to  the  United  States  of  the  lock  type  of  canal  will  amount  to 
$375,201,000.  In  the  preparation  of  these  estimates  there  are  no 
unknown  factors. 

The  estimated  cost  of  the  sea-level  canal  for  construction  alone 
sums  up  to  $477,601,000,  and  if  to  this  be  added  the  cost  of  sanita- 


16  ISTHMIAN    CANAL. 

tion  and  civil  government  up  to  the  time  of  the  completion  of  the 
canal,  which  will  be  at  least  six  years  later  than  the  lock  canal, 
and  the  purchase  price,  the  total  cost  to  the  United  States  will  aggre- 
gate $563,000,000.  In  this  case,  however,  parts  of  the  estimate  are 
more  or  less  conjectural — such  as  the  cost  of  diverting  the  Chagres 
to  permit  the  building  of  the  Gamboa  dam  and  the  cost  of  con- 
structing the  dam  itself.  Much  has  been  said  of  the  disadvantage 
of  the  seamy  rock  in  connection  with  some  experiments  made  at 
Spillway  Hill  test  pit  and  of  the  so-called  "  indurated  clay,"  yet 
these  same  disadvantages  apply  to  the  foundation  at  Gamboa  and 
the  same  class  of  material  must  be  dealt  with.  The  cost  of  con- 
structing and  maintaining  a  channel  through  the  swamps  of  the 
lower  Chagres  is  an  unknown  factor,  and  no  schemes  have  been 
developed  for  controlling  the  various  streams  that  are  encountered 
and  that  must  be  reckoned  with  along  the  route  of  the  canal. 
So  that  the  sea-level  estimates  have  not  the  accuracy  of  those  for 
the  lock  type. 

The  majority  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  estimated  that 
from  ten  to  thirteen  years  would  be  required  for  the  completion  of 
the  sea-level  canal.  The  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  and  the  then 
Chief  Engineer  fixed  the  time  from  eighteen  to  twenty  years.  It  will 
take  at  least  six  years  to  complete  the  dam  at  Gamboa,  and  until  the 
control  of  the  Chagres  Kiver  is  assured,  little  if  any  excavation  can  be 
carried  lower  than  40  to  50  feet  above  sea  level,  so  that  in  the  absence 
of  anything  more  definite  the  time  needed  to  construct  the  Gamboa 
dam  is  assumed  as  the  additional  period  needed  for  completing  the 
sea-level  type. 

Much  criticism  has  resulted  because  of  the  excess  of  the  present 
estimates  over  those  originally  proposed,  arising  largely  from  a  fail- 
ure to  analyze  the  two  estimates,  or  to  appreciate  fully  the  actual 
conditions. 

The  estimates  prepared  and  accompanying  the  report  of  the  con- 
sulting engineers  were  based  on  data  less  complete  than  are  available 
at  present.  The  unit  costs  in  the  report  of  1906  are  identical  with 
those  in  the  report  of  1901,  and  since  1906  there  has  been  an  increase 
in  the  wage  scale  and  in  tjie  cost  of  material.  On  the  Isthmus 
wages  exceed  those  in  the  United  States  from  40  to  80  per  cent  for 
the  same  class  of  labor.  The  original  estimates  were  based  on  a 
ten-hour  day,  but  Congress  imposed  the  eight-hour  day.  Subse- 


ISTHMIAN   CANAL.  17 

quent  surveys  and  the  various  changes  already  noted  have  increased 
the  quantity  of  work  by  50  per  cent,  whereas  the  unit  costs  have 
increased  only  20  per  cent — not  such  a  bad  showing.  In  addition, 
municipal  improvements  in  Panama  and  Colon,  advances  to  the 
Panama  Railroad  and  moneys  received  and  deposited  to  the  credit 
of  miscellaneous  receipts  aggregate  $15,000,000,  which  amount  will 
eventually  and  has  in  part  already  been  returned  to  the  Treasury. 
Finally,  no  such  system  of  housing  and  caring  for  employees  was 
ever  contemplated  as  has  been  introduced  and  installed,  materially 
increasing  the  overhead  charges  and  administration. 

Much  stress  has  been  laid  upon  the  fact  that  recent  improvements 
in  machinery  have  so  modified  conditions  that  the  excavation  can 
be  done  more  economically  by  special  devices  in  conjunction  with 
dredging  than  is  possible  with  the  methods  now  adopted.  The 
machines  referred  to  are  for  shattering  rock  under  water,  and  though 
it  is  claimed  that  such  devices  have  given  satisfactory  results  in 
connection  with  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  it  is  known  that  similar 
appliances  have  failed  in  certain  localities  in  the  United  States 
where  they  were  tried.  The  variations  in  the  character  of  the  rock 
on  the  Isthmus  from  soft  argillaceous  sandstone  to  hard  trap  are 
such  as  to  make  the  use  of  such  devices  very  problematical.  Experi- 
ence generally  has  shown  that  more  money  can  be  wasted  on  sub- 
aqueous rock  excavation  than  in  the  removal  of  such  material  in 
the  dry.  Experiments  are  now  being  made  on  the  Isthmus  with 
one  of  these  rock-crushing  devices,  but  thus  far  the  results  are  not 
promising. 

Much  has  been  written  recently  concerning  the  probable  effect  of 
earthquakes.  The  last  earthquake  of  any  importance  occurred  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  and  existing  ruins  in  Panama  demonstrate 
clearly  that  no  shock  of  any  violence  could  have  occurred  during  the 
eighteenth  or  nineteenth  centuries.  Should  an  earthquake  visit  the 
Isthmus  the  chances  are  that  the  effect  upon  the  Gatun  dam  would  be 
less  disastrous  than  upon  the  Gamboa  dam.  The  solid  concrete  con- 
struction of  the  locks,  strengthened  by  reenf orcements,  will  be  as  proof 
against  any  earth  shocks  as  any  structure  which  man  builds  any- 
where, and  the  sea-level  canal  has  as  mifch  to  fear  as  the  lock  canal. 

The  vulnerability  of  J,he  lock  canal  in  time  of  war  is  another  argu- 
ment advanced  in  favor  of  the  sea-level  type,  but  has  little  weight,  as 
the  sea-level  type  is  equally  vulnerable  from  attacks  by  land  or  air 


18  ISTHMIAN    CANAL. 

in  its  Gamboa  dam  as  are  tidal  locks  and  the  various  devices  for 
controlling  the  streams  along  the  route. 

The  idea  of  the  sea-level  canal  appeals  to  the  popular  mind,  which 
pictures  an  open  ditch  offering  free  and  unobstructed  navigation 
from  sea  to  sea,  but  no  such  substitute  is  offered  for  the  present 
lock  canal.  As  between  the  sea-level  and  the  lock  canal,  the  latter 
can  be  constructed  in  less  time,  at  less  cost,  will  give  easier  and  safer 
navigation,  and  in  addition  secure  such  a  control  of  the  Chagres 
River  as  to  make  a  friend  and  aid  of  what  remains  an  enemy  and 
menace  in  the  sea-level  type. 

In  this  connection  attention  is  invited  to  the  statement  made  by 
Mr.  Taft,  when  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  letter  transmitting  the  reports 
of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers : 

We  may  wejl  concede  that  if  we  could  have  a  sea-level  canal  with  a  prism  of  300  to 
400  feet  wide,  with  the  curves  that  must  now  exist  reduced,  it  would  be  preferable  to 
the  plan  of  the  minority,  but  the  time  and  cost  of  constructing  such  a  canal  are  in 
effect  prohibitive. 

We  are  justly  proud  of  the  organization  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
work.  The  force  originally  organized  by  Mr.  John  F.  Stevens  for 
the  attack  upon  the  continental  divide  has  been  modified  and  en- 
larged as  the  necessities  of  the  situation  required,  until  at  the  pres- 
ent time  it  approaches  the  perfection  of  a  huge  machine,  and  all  are 
working  together  to  a  common  end.  The  manner  in  which  the  work 
is  being  done  and  the  spirit  of  enthusiasm  that  is  manifested  by  all 
forcibly  strikes  everyone  who  visits  the  works. 

The  main  object  of  our  being  there  is  the  construction  of  the  canal; 
everything  else  is  subordinate  to  it,  and  the  work  of  every  depart- 
ment is  directed  to  the  accomplishment  of  that  object. 

In  addition  to  the  department  of  construction  and  engineering, 
there  are  the  departments  of  sanitation  and  civil  administration, 
the  quartermaster's  and  subsistence  departments,  the  purchasing 
department  organized  in  the  United  States,  the  legal  department, 
and  the  departments  of  examination  of  accounts  and  disbursements. 
Subordinated  to,  but  acting  in  conjunction  with,  the  commission  is 
the  Panama  Railroad. 

Too  much  credit  can  not  be  given  to  the  department  of  sanitation, 
which,  in  conjunction  with  the  division  of  municipal  engineering, 
has  wrought  such  a  change  in  the  conditions  as  they  existed  in  1904 
as  to  make  the  construction  of  the  canal  possible.  This  department 


ISTHMIAN    CANAL.  19 

is  subdivided  into  the  health  department,  which  has  charge  of  the 
hospitals,  supervision  of  health  matters  in  Panama  and  Colon,  and  of 
the  quarantine,  and  into  the  sanitary  inspection  department,  which 
looks  after  the  destruction  of  the  mosquito  by  various  methods,  by 
grass  and  brush  cutting,  the  draining  of  various  swampy  areas,  and 
the  oiling  of  unavoidable  pools  and  stagnant  streams. 

According  to  the  statistics  of  the  health  department,  based  on  the 
death  rate,  the  Canal  Zone  is  one  of  the  healthiest  communities  in 
the  world,  but  in  this  connection  it  must  be  remembered  that  our 
population  consists  of  men  and  women  in  the  prime  of  life,  with  few 
if  any  of  the  aged,  and  that  a  number  of  the  sick  are  returned  to  the 
United  States  before  death  overtakes  them. 

To  the  sanitary  department  are  also  assigned  11  chaplains  employed 
by  the  commission  to  attend  the  sick,  as  well  as  to  look  after  the 
spiritual  welfare  of  the  employees.  At  most  of  the  villages  there  is 
a  combined  church  and  lodge  house  so  constructed  that  the  lower 
floor  is  used  for  divine  service,  while  the  upper  part  provides  places 
for  meetings  of  the  various  lodges.  The  assignment  of  time  to  min- 
isters and  to  lodges  is  made  by  the  quartermaster's  department. 

The  department  of  civil  administration  exercises  supervision  over 
the  courts,  which  consist  of  three  circuit  and  five  district  judges ;  the 
three  former,  sitting  in  lane,  constitute  the  supreme  court.  The 
dirtrict  courts  take  cognizance  of  all  cases  where  the  fine  does  not 
exceed  $100  or  imprisonment  does  not  exceed  thirty  days.  Jury  trials 
are  restricted  to  crimes  involving  the  death  penalty  or  life  impris- 
onment— in  short,  summary  justice  rules,  and  so  long  as  the  zone 
is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  construction  camp  this  form  of  law 
or  justice  will  continue  to  be  the  most  satisfactory. 

The  department  of  civil  administration  has  charge  also  of  the 
police  force,  the  post-offices,  collection  of  customs  and  taxes,  the 
issue  of  licenses,  and  the  public-school  system.  The  schools  are 
improved  to  such  an  extent  that  the  children  of  the  employees  have 
very  nearly  the  same  advantages  as  in  the  United  States  up  to  and 
including  the  high-school  courses. 

The  quartermaster's  department  has  charge  of  the  recruiting  of 
labor,  the  care,  repair,  and  maintenance  of  quarters,  the  collection 
and  disposal  of  garbage  and  refuse,  the  issue  of  furniture,  and  the 
delivery  of  distilled  water  and  commissary  supplies  to  the  houses 
of  employees,  and  is  to  have  charge  of  the  construction  of  all  new 


20  ISTHMIAN    CANAL,. 

buildings.  Operating  in  conjunction  with  the  purchasing  depart- 
ment in  the  States,  the  quartermaster's  department  secures  all  sup- 
plies needed  for  construction  and  other  purposes  and  makes  pur- 
chases of  materials  on  the  Isthmus  when  required. 

The  common-labor  force  of  the  commission  and  the  Panama  Rail- 
road aggregates  in  the  neighborhood  of  25,000  men,  and  consists  of 
about  6,000  Spaniards,  with  a  few  Italians,  the  remainder  being 
from  the  West  Indies.  The  Spaniard  is  the  best  laborer,  as  he 
possesses  more  strength  and  endurance.  Under  some  conditions  this 
is  not  true,  the  foreigner  strenuously  objecting  to  doing  work  that 
requires  him  to  stand  in  water. 

All  the  skilled  labor,  the  clerical  force,  and  the  higher  officials  are 
Americans  and  are  recruited  through  the  Washington  office. 

This  department  also  has  charge  of  all  the  property  records,  receives 
semiannual  returns  of  property  from  all  those  to  whom  property  has 
been  issued,  and  checks  the  returns  and  inventories  of  the  store- 
houses, made  at  certain  times,  with  the  records  compiled  from  original 
invoices. 

The  subsistence  department  has  charge  of  the  commissaries  and  the 
manufacturing  plants  which  consist  of  an  ice  and  cold-storage  estab- 
lishment, a  bread,  pie,  and  cake  bakery,  a  coffee-roasting  outfit,  and 
a  laundry.  These  belong  to  the  Panama  Railroad  Company,  as,  at 
the  time  they  were  established,  money  received  from  sales  could  be 
reapplied,  whereas  if  operated  by  the  commission  the  money  would 
have  reverted  to  the  Treasury,  necessitating  reappropriation  before  the 
proceeds  of  sale  could  be  utilized.  They  are,  however,  under  the 
management  of  the  subsistence  officer  of  the  commission,  who  has 
charge  of  the  various  hotels,  kitchens,  and  messes  of  the  commission. 

There  are  16  hotels  from  Cristobal  to  Panama,  which  serve  meals 
to  the  American,  or  gold,  employees  at  30  cents  per  meal.  There 
are  24  messes  where  meals  to  European  laborers  are  served,  the 
cost  per  day  to  such  laborers  being  40  cents;  and  there  are  24 
kitchens,  or  messes,  for  meals  supplied  to  the  silver  laborers,  or 
West  Indians,  the  cost  to  the  laborer  being  30  cents  per  day  for  3 
meals.  Subsistence  is  furnished  without  profit  to  the  commission, 
though  every  effort  is  made  to  have  the  institutions  self-supporting. 
The  commissaries  and  manufacturing  plants  are  operated  at  a  profit 
so  as  to  reimburse  the  Panama  Railroad  Company  for  its  outlay  in 
six  years  from  January  1,  1909,  at  4  per  cent  interest. 


ISTHMIAN    CANAL.  21 

The  subsistence  department  also  has  charge  of  the  Hotel  Tivoli, 
which  is  a  large  hotel  located  at'  Ancon,  for  the  entertainment  of 
the  commission's  employees  at  a  comparatively  low  rate,  and  of 
transient  guests  at  rates  usually  charged  at  first-class  hotels. 

All  moneys  are  handled  by  the  disbursing  officer,  who  pays  accounts 
that  have  been  previously  passed  upon  by  the  examiner  of  accounts. 
This  last-named  official  makes  the  administrative  examination 
required  by  law  prior  to  the  final  audit  of  the  accounts  by  the 
Auditor  for  the  War  Department.  The  pay  rolls  are  prepared  from 
time  books  kept  by  foremen,  timekeepers,  or  field  clerks,  subse- 
quently checked  by  the  examiner  of  accounts,  who  maintains  a 
force  of  time  inspectors.  The  time  inspectors  visit  each  gang, 
generally  daily,  at  unknown  times  to  the  foreman,  timekeeper,  or 
field  clerk,  and  check  the  time  books  with  the  gangs  of  workmen; 
the  inspectors  report  to  the  examiner  of  accounts  the  results  of 
their  inspection  not  only  in  connection  with  timekeeping,  but  all 
violations  of  the  regulations  of  the  commission  that  may  come 
under  their  observation. 

Payments  of  pay  rolls  are  made  in  cash,  beginning  on  the  12th  of 
each  month  and  consuming  four  days  for  the  entire  force  on  the 
Isthmus.  All  American  employees  and  European  laborers  are  paid 
in  gold;  all  on  the  so-called  " silver  roll'7  are  paid  in  Panamanian 
silver. 

The  department  of  construction  and  engineering  is  under  the  direct 
charge  of  the  Chief  Engineer.  He  is  assisted  by  the  Assistant  Chief 
Engineer,  who  considers  and  reports  upon  all  engineering  questions 
submitted  for  final  action.  The  Assistant  Chief  Engineer  has  charge 
of  the  designs  of  the  locks,  dams,  and  spillways,  and  supervision  of 
these  particular  parts  of  the  work.  There  is  attached  to  the  Chief 
Engineer  an  assistant  to  the  chief  engineer,  who  looks  after  mechan- 
ical forces  on  the  Isthmus,  and  has  supervision  over  the  machine 
shops,  the  cost-keeping  branch  of  the  work,  the  apportionment  of 
appropriations,  and  the  preparation  of  the  estimates.  There  is  also 
an  assistant  engineer,  who  has  charge  of  all  general  surveys,  meteoro- 
logical observations,  and  river  hydraulics. 

The  zone  is  divided^territori^  in to^ three  divisions/ each  in  charge 
of  a  division  engineer,  the  first  extending  from  deep  water  in  the 
Caribbean  south  to  include  the  Gatun  locks  and  dams,  known  as  the 


22  ISTHMIAN    CANAL. 

"Atlantic  division."  The  second,  or  "  Central  Division,"  extends  from 
Gatun  to  Pedro  Miguel,  and  includes  the  excavation  through  the 
continental  divide.  The  third,  or  "Pacific  Division,"  extends  from 
Pedro  Miguel,  including  the  locks  and  dams  of  that  locality,  to  deep 
water  in  the  Pacific. 

The  general  plans  emanate  from  the  office  of  the  Chief  Engineer 
and  the  details  are  left  to  division  engineers,  subject  to  the  approval 
of  the  Chief  Engineer.  The  whole  idea  of  the  organization  in  the 
Department  of  Construction  and  Engineering,  and  in  fact  of  all  the 
work,  is  to  place  and  fix  responsibility,  leaving  to  each  subordinate 
the  carrying  out  of  the  particular  part  of  the  work  intrusted  to  his 
charge. 

Each  division  engineer  has  charge  not  only  of  the  work  involved 
in  the  construction  of  the  canal,  but  all  municipal  engineering, 
including  water  supply,  building  and  maintaining  roads,  and  the 
establishment  and  maintenance  of  sewer  systems.  With  the  force 
under  his  charge  the  division  engineer  executes  such  sanitary  drain- 
ing as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  chief  sanitary  officer,  so  that  all 
construction  work,  excepting  the  construction  of  buildings,  con- 
cerning the  location  of  which  the  division  engineer  is  consulted, 
however,  is  directly  in  the  hands  of  the  division  engineer. 

Attached  to  the  office  of  the  chairman  is  a  general  Y.  M.  C.  A. 
secretary,  who  has  supervision  of  the  commission's  clubhouses, 
which  are  operated  and  maintained  under  the  auspices  of  the  Y.  M. 
C.  A.  Four  of  these  are  now  constructed  and  in  operation,  and  four 
more  are  to  be  built  from  funds  recently  made  available  by  Congress. 
They  have  done  much  toward  securing  a  greater  permanency  to 
the  force,  in  giving  healthful  amusement,  and  to  a  better  content- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  employees. 

I  have  endeavored  to  show  that  a  channel  of  sufficient  width, 
in  which  the  waters  of  the  many  streams,  especially  the  Chagres, 
will  not  be  a  menace,  is  one  most  desired  for  an  Isthmian  canal. 
The  sea-level  canal  proposed  by  the  majority  of  the  Board  of  Con- 
sulting Engineers  is  not  of  sufficient  width,  nor  is  the  proposed  solu- 
tion for  the  impounding  and  diversion  of  the  Chagres  and  other 
streams  based  upon  sufficient  investigations  to  insure  its  success. 
The  "ideal"  sea-level  canal,  the  Straits  of  Panama,  recently  pro- 
posed, is  not  based  upon  any  investigations  of  the  work  to  be  done 


ISTHMIAN    CANAL.  23 

and  can  not,  in  view  of  the  approximate  estimate  of  the  cost  of  our 
ownjsea-level  canal,  which  is  about  one-third  the  size  of  the  " ideal" 
plan,  be  given  serious  consideration.  Every  criticism  against  the 
stability  of  our  locks  or  dams  can  be  attributed  to  either  an  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  one's  own  plans  or  to  absolute  ignorance  of  the 
•exhaustive  data  concerning  their  safety  now  in  existence.  The  sev- 
eral other  plans  of  lock-type  canal  have  nothing  in  their  favor  that 
the  plan  now  adopted  does  not  possess  to  a  greater  degree. 

I  have  endeavored  also  to  show  that  the  organization  on  the 
Isthmus  is  compact  and  complete  in  every  way,  performing  its  duties 
of  construction,  sanitation,  and  government  with  clocklike  precision. 
I  can  not  do  better  than  quote  from  the  message  recently  sent  to  the 
Congress,  "that  hereafter  attack  on  this  type — the  lock  type — is  in 
reality  merely  attack  upon  the  policy  of  building  any  canal  at  all,'* 
for  the  adoption  of  a  sea-level  canal  anywhere  approaching  the  ease 
of  navigation  of  the  lock  type  will  result  in  the  ultimate  abandon- 
ment of  the  canal;  and  I  assure  you  that  several  years  hence,  no 
later  than  January  1,  1915,  even  the  most  ardent  sea-level  advo- 
cates will,  in  making  the  voyage  through  the  canal,  admit  that  the 
ability  to  navigate  a  battle  ship  at  a  high  rate  of  speed  through  the 
lake  and  wide  channel  from  Gatun  to  Pedro  Miguel  far  outweighs  the 
small  inconveniences  of  the  safe  lockages  up  to  and  down  from  the 
summit  level. 

MAR  1  G 1909  ° 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 

AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


MOV  101941  * 


USB 


MAY  2  7  1961 


MAR    5  1942t 


— 


9   1947 


m 


19Nov*49Jfl 


.IBRARY  USE 


JUN 1  $  2005 


MAR  1 7  1954 


J7Jun'54TFP 


1  /p... 


- 


LD  21-100m-7,'4v 


Ciaylamount 
Pamphlet 

Binder 
Gaylord  Bros..  Inc. 

Stockton,  Calif. 

T.M.Reg.  U.S.  Pat.  Off. 


U.C.  BERKELEY  LIBRAfl 


CD05SbOSU3 


M67198 


TC774 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


